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A COMPARISON OF THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
HARRY B. LITTELL*
Anglo-American jurisprudence always has been cautious
in cutting off claims on bases which do not go to the merit
of the action. Nevertheless from the Limitation Act of 1623
through to modern times courts both in England and the
United States have supported the legislative policy either be-
cause the security of all men depend upon it,1 or because the
limitations have been fixed by the legislature and courts
could not inquire into the conscientiousness of the applica-
tion.2
Blackstone suggested that the reasons for the limita-
tion of actions for the recovery of realty were founded on the
following proposition:
(1) To punish the neglect of plaintiff;
(2) Because there was a presumption that the adversary had
gamed good title or he would have sued earlier.3
And where the action did not involve realty the same prin-
ciple was frequently emphasized in the decisions. "It has
been supposed that the Legislature only meant to protect
persons who had paid their debts but from length of time had
destroyed proof of payment. From the title of the act until
the last section every word of it shows that it was not passed
on this narrow ground. It is, as I have often heard it
called by great judges, an Act of peace. Long dormant claims
have often more of cruelty than of justice in them. Christian-
ity forbids us to attempt to enforce the payment of a debt
which time and misfortune have rendered the debtor unable
to discharge. The Legislature thought that if a demand
was not attempted to be enforced within six years some good
excuse for non-payment might be presumed, and took away
the legal power of recovering it."
To date, however, the primary principle of limitations is
supported by the desire to compel the settlement of claims
*Third year student, Indiana University School of Law
1. Green v. Rivet, 2 Salk. 421 (1702).
2. Reeves v. Butcher, (1891) 2 Q.B. 509, 511.
3. Bl. Comm., Vol. III, p. 188.
4. A'Court v. Cross, 3 Bing. 329, 333 (1825).
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within a reasonable time while the evidence is still fresh and
both evidence and witnesses are obtainable., The old pre-
sumption of payment, satisfaction or release has been dis-
carded.6
Historically, the limitations (time periods) were first
reckoned from some well-known date, such as the first year
of the reign of a certain king. Gradually a limitation in
terms of a definite number of years was adopted. At first
the time period was very long and only a few actions were
included within the Statute.7 But the step to an all-
inclusive statute with relatively short periods of limitations
was not too difficult. However, it is apparent that this step
was not taken all at once, nor is it yet completed.
But whatever the historical development or the prin-
ciples upon which succeeding ages have rationalized the
statute, it is generally conceded that today the statute is one
of merit. And whereas it was once frowned upon with
disfavor, today it is regarded as beneficial and based upon
sound policy. It remains to be seen, however, whether the
statutes of the various states in prescribing the numerous
limitations fulfill these principles. Too often the limitations
are treated as a law unto themselves without any attempt
to reconcile them either to a logical system or to plain reason.
With the passage of time and with the multiplication
of jurisdictions in the United States considerable diversity
has arisen concerning the length of time which must elapse
before a cause of action is barred. The diversity in part
suggests differences in state policy concerning the time within
which an action may be brought but frequently the diversity
only reflects accidental differences. Likewise because of
the antiquity of the statutes the original policy in regard to
time periods may no longer represent the most desirable prac-
tice in commercial and real property transaction.
The following materials attempt to survey the statutes
relating to civil actions in the various states with special
emphasis upon the "time period" allowed for the bringing
5. Wood, Limitations, §5.
6. See also (1940) 190 L.T. 303.
7. Wood, Limitations, §2.
8. Wood, Limitations, §4. For a sharp criticism see (1940) 190 L.T.
303.
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of such action.9  Although many statutes might be dis-
tinguishable because of their distinctive wording their basic
similarity is such that they may be significantly compared
on the basis of the "time periods" involved.
The source of each statute is the latest compiled code
or compiled statutes of the state concerned. 0  Some compila-
tions are more authentic and up-to-date than others; how-
ever, the selected sources are reliable for our purposes. The
relative position of Indiana in comparison with other states
both as to similarities and dissimilarities has been indicated.
I. General Consideration
All of the states have by legislative action adopted limi-
tations on the time for bringing causes in both the civil and
criminal actions. Although there is similarity in wording
and time-periods among the various Statutes of Limitation,
there are naturally many variations not a few of which go
to the substance of the limitations themselves.
The most notable variations, aside from the expected
differences in length of the period relating to a specific action,
concern:
1. The substance of the limitation in actions for recovery of real
estate;
2. The application of disabilities to stop or extend the running
of the statute.
Another apparent wide variation deals with the limita-
tion on sealed instruments. However, it should be noted that
those states which allow a longer periad for sealed instruments
are the ones which still give special emphasis to the seal, while
those states where the period is shorter are those in which
the seal no longer has any special significance. Generally in
the latter states sealed instruments and written instruments
are on a par, while in the former, a longer period is given
to sealed instruments than to mere written instruments.
The discussion following of limitations and disabilities is
made in reference to the accompanying table, (see Appendix
A, p 39) showing the number of years allowed by each state
for each action. A short comparison of the figures, if such
9. See Appendix A, Table I. "Time-periods Allowed for Bringing
Actions."
10. For a complete list of the sections of each code or compiled statutes
referred to, see the appendix to this article.
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is necessary, will be made in each section and the discussion
following is intended as a basis for a better understanding
of the statutes in the table.
II. Limitations
A. General
Before taking up the limitations on real and personal
actions specifically, a few general rules applicable to both
types of actions should be mentioned. These general pro-
visions are found in the statutes of most states either in a
separate section or intermingled with the sections on real and
personal actions.
They will be set out briefly:
1. No limitation, other than the one specified by
statute, may be set by the parties to the transaction.
2. After a cause of action is barred, a new promise,
to be effective in removing the bar, must be in
writing, signed by the person charged."
3. On the question of whether an indorsement noting
partial payment or payment of interest by the hold-
er is sufficient to remove a bar to a bill or note,
there is considerable diversity. Most states do not
give it this effect unless the endorsement is signed
by the maker, or the one to be charged.
4. If a court issues an injunction or writ of prohibi-
tion in the trial of a caus6 of action, such time is
not included in the running of the statute.12
5. A new promise, after a cause of action is barred,
by one joint-promisor, joint-debtor, etc. is not ef-
fective against other joint promisors.
6. When one of the parties to a cause of action is
a citizen of a country with which the United States
has been at war, the period of the war is not a part
of the statutory period.
7. There is disagreement as to the commencement
of a cause of action. Most states say it begins
when the complaint is filed-but there is also dis-
11. For a discussion of a new oral promise made before the statute
had expired on the old written promise, see (1940) 1 W. & L.L.
Rev. 301.
12. Where the suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, same result.
(1937) 17 B.U. L. Rev., 900.
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agreement as to when a complaint is effectively
filed. 13  The exact moment of effectiveness is more
or less an arbitrary matter. Most states are in-
clined to hold a complaint effective when it is filed
with the clerk, others when delivery is made to the
sheriff, and others when process is served on the
defendants.
8. In case of fraud, the cause of action does not com-
mence until discovery of the fraud.1 4
9. Actions barred in another state on a cause of action
originating in that state, are barred everywhere.
Some states, however, give their own citizens a
preference if the statute has not yet run in their
state.
10. When suits against a political subdivision of the
state are allowed, notice of a claim must be present-
ed to the subdivision within a specified period (usu-
ally from 30 to 90 days) before suit can be brought.
11. A counter-claim valid at the time the plaintiff files
his complaint is a valid counter-claim although it
has been subsequently barred.' 5
12. The Statute of Limitations in order to be used as
a defense must be pleaded specifically as a bar.16
(But it may be permissible to amend the pleadings
after trial has begun to include a pleading of the
statute.)
13. Actions by the State.17 The tendency is to per-
mit the statute to run against the State. A slight
majority of states still adhere to the older rule,
while others have taken a middle position and allow
the Statute to run against it except in real actions.
13. See, as to suits against the United States under the Tucker Act,
(1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1087.
14. There are instances of attempting to get out of the normal limita-
tion by envoking the fraud exception. The courts have not been
too friendly toward this subterfuge, see (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev.
1300.
15. This is the majority rule. For an illuminating discussion of
this phase including a breaking down of counterclaims into re-
coupment, set-off, and statutory counterclaims, see (1943) 31 Calif.
L. Rev. 210.
16. Wood, Limitations, §7.
17. Limitations of Time which Apply to Actions Against the State of
New York, (1936) N.Y.L. Rev. Comm. 975-991.
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14. Once the Statute has started to run, no subsequent
event will stop it, except the defendant's absence
from the State.18
It is apparent that most of the above provisions, although
not limited to any one action or limitation, are necessary pro-
visions to any effective Statute of Limitations. They should
form a separate section of the statute, preferably preceding
the more specific sections relating to particular actions.
Although the Statute of Limitation is now considered a
meritorious defense, since it cuts off rights, either sub-
stantive, or remedial, or both, the tendency is to construe it
strictly.1"
The fact that there is no Federal Statute of Limitations
has led to some confusion. Generally, the limitations of the
State wherein the court sits have been held to prevail but
this has not always led to desirable consequences.
20
B. Limitations on Real Actions.
Perhaps the greatest variation found among the statutes
is in the field of real actions. The length of the period
itself varies greatly, ranging from three years21 to forty
years. 22  Greater refinements have been made concerning
these actions than any others. There are four logical divisions
'to which the statutes lend themselves.
1. Actions by or against the State or one holding
from the State.
2. Actions by or against individuals claiming under
"color of title".
3. Actions by or against individuals claiming on mere
possesion alone.
4. Actions by or against individuals holding title from
an execution or judgment sale.
A fifth division made by some states concern actions
by or against individuals holding by virtue of deeds from
the State which have been declared void by a court.
Where a state allows the statute to run against itself
18. Wood, Limitations, §6.
19. Wood, Limitations, §4.
20. (1941) 49 Yale L.J. 738.
21. Arizona, Texas (under "color of title").
22. Maine (on bare possession alone).
[Vol. 21
1945] COMPARISON OF THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS 29
a longer period is usually required to obtain adverse posses-
sion against the State or an individual holding from it.23
This may be explained as a relaxation of the former general
rule that one could not maintain adverse possession at all
against the sovereign. 24
The reasons given for the statute not running against
the state 5 are mainly historical-that the sovereign is too
busy to protect his own rights, or that the sovereign makes his
own rules to govern his courts. Today the chief reason given
is that a loss due to negligence of public officers in prose-
cuting claims ultimately rests on the taxpayers who should
be spared this extra burden.26
In spite of these reasons, the principles behind the Statute
of Limitations generally are as applicable to the state as
to private individuals. However, the presumption that
the statute does not run against the state, unless specifically
provided by the legislature still stands. 2T A large number
of state legislatures have so provided.28
The distinction between one holding under "color of
title", usually defined as an instrument duly recorded pur-
porting to give title but which for some reason is defective,
and one holding by mere possession is basically valid. Our
modern recording statutes lend substantial reason for placing
a shorter period on conveyances recorded, even though they
may be defective.
A requirement, so generally recognized that in some
statutes it is not even mentioned, is that a person seeking
to recover land must have been seized, or claim from one
who was seized, of the disputed land within the statutory
period.
The most recent and notable development in the field
of real actions is the requirement that a person claiming
23. The advantage of a longer period is usually granted in real actions
only. In personal actions no advantage is given.
24. The situation in Indiana is confusing. The statute does run
against the state as concerns sureties Burns §2-613 and also in
actions dealing with title to land. Burns §3-1411.
25. On the question of the statute running against a foreign state, see(1938) 26 Calif. L Rev. 713.
26. (1938) 26 Calif. L. Rev. 713.
27. For a good discussion of this topic, see (1944) 38 Ill. L. Rev. 713.
28. At least 17 states are included in this group. In only one state(Arizona) have the courts ruled that the statute runs against the
state in the absence of such a provision.
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title by adverse possession must have paid taxes on the
property for a specified number of years,29 usually coexten-
sive with the statutory period. This requirement is in-
creasing and is consistent in supporting the claim whether
it is under color of title or by possession alone.30  How-
ever, it has the practical effect of requiring all claims to be
under a recorded instrument (i.e., color of title), since in
most states taxes can only be paid on recorded property. It
therefore appears that in this recent trend adverse posses-
sion based on mere possession is gradually diminishing as a
means of gaining title. This is a natural development in
states where most of the land is now occupied.
In contrast, a considerable number of states, have adopt-
ed the rule that possession is the primary factor, but a person
holding under color of title gains all the land described in
the instrument.3 1 Without such an instrument the adverse
possessor gets only as much as he actually occupies which
may not be all that he claims.
Most, but not all Statutes of Limitations define adverse
possession.3 2  For the most part the states have adopted the
common law rules., The necessary factors are:
1. Claim of ownership against the whole world.
2. Actual and visible possession.
a. Open and notorious
b. Acts of ownership, of which the general nature of the land
permits. (This includes requirements of enclosure.)
Frequently the payment of taxes is made a requisite of
adverse possession. Likewise, color of title arising from
a recorded instrument may affect the extent of the adverse
claim.
A comparison of the time periods will indicate wide
variation. In those states where the statute permits ad-
verse possession against the state, a longer period is usually
required.33  And the same is true of one holding under
a grant from the state.
29. I.e., Arkansas, Tennessee.
30. Indiana is included as requiring payment of taxes Burn's §3-1314.
31. E.g., Nevada, South Carolina, South Dakota.
32. There is no clear-cut statute in Indiana defining adverse posses-
sion. The courts have said it must be actual, visible, open and
notorious, under claim of ownership.
33. E.g., California, Idaho, New York.
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In those states allowing a difference of time for a record-
ed color of title, one holding under such color of title has a
shorter period. 34  One holding under a deed from the state,
subsequently declared void by a court, also has the advantage
of a shorter period before adverse possession gives him title.
Gaining title by mere possession as might be expected
is usually between the two extremes pointed out.
Where there is a different length of time required to
gain title under an execution or judgment sale, the statutes
give a purchaser the benefit of a shorter period to make his
title undisputable.35  Little comment is necessary concern-
ing limitations for actions for injury to real property and
actions to recover rents and profits. The variation here
is not so marked. In general the statutory period is close
to that allowed for the recovery of or injury to personal
property, and is considerably less than the period for the
recovery of real estate.
There is also little variation on actions on mortgages
of real property. 6  Generally the period is similar to the
period required for recovery of possession against one hold-
ing or claiming on mere possession. However, the figures
in the table might lead to possible misunderstanding since
it is evident that only fourteen states have specific limitations
on mortgages. A review of those states which are silent
on the subject reveals that the courts of some states have
included mortgages under the limitations on actions to re-
cover land, while others have included them under the limita-
tions on either written or sealed instruments. It appears
that the latter is the majority holding. Likewise, there is
direct conflict on the proposition that when suit on the note
or debt is barred, suit on the mortgage is barred. A
majority seems to favor the proposition 3 7 but the courts in
a few states have adopted the opposite conclusion."8
The length of the period in Indiana for recovery of pos-
session is considerably above the average, although an identical
number of years is allowed in about a dozen other states.
34. E.g., Arizona, Colorado, Kentucky, Texas.
35. E.g., Indiana, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Oklahoma.
36. As to when the statute starts to run on a deficiency judgment
against a mortgagor, see (1939) 11 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 130.
37. I.e., Arkansas, Mississippi, Wisconsin.
38. I.e., Ohio.
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The same is true of mortgages. The number of years allow-
ed in Indiana for an action for injury to real property is
again twice the average, although a number of other states
have identical periods.
In most other respects the Indiana limitations are in
general conformity with the majority of states.
C. Personal Actions.
The limitation statutes dealing with personal actions are
more harmonious than those concerning real actions. The
time periods are uniformly shorter. The difference is trace-
able solely to the historical significance attached to real
property. It is questionable, however, whether this wide
variation is defensible in -light of the principles behind the
statute. The goal of prompt settlement of disputes is not
altered by the character of the property or claim involved.
However, there is one consideration that must be noted in
order to understand the accompanying table-that is the
length and detail of each statute. Although the statutes do
little more than enumerate the actions and the corresponding
limitations, some statutes go into greater detail in the num-
ber of actions specifically set out. This does not mean that
there is no limitation on those actions not enumerated but
merely that they are included in the general limitation re-
served for "all other actions."
A general limitation is essential since a legislature can-
not foresee all statutory actions which subsequently will be
enacted. Yet several states have no general limitation
statutes. However, some of those states9 have statutes stated
in general terms, such as "all actions of tort" or, "all actions of
contract," etc., intended to serve the same purpose. One
or two states have clauses specifically providing that only
those actions enumerated in the statute shall have limitations.
There is one other respect in which the accompanying
table may be misleading. While it does contain the most
important actions, it does not contain every action in every
statute where a limitation has been specified. There are two
reasons for this: first, the table is meant only to show the
actions most commonly contained in the statutes of all states
and no attempt was made to-include a limitation of an action
contained in only one or two states; second, many limita-
39. I.e., Colorado, Vermont.
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tions are made a part of the statute setting up a cause of
action and are not included in the Statute of Limitations. This,
of course, could be remedied by amending or adding to the
Statute of Limitations at the time a new statute is enacted.
But most states have seen fit to use an alternative and to in-
clude in the Statute of Limitations a second general clause
validating limitations reserved within other statutes. A
leading example of the type referred to is the limitation of
actions under Workmen's Compensation Laws, which are
usually included within the statute on Workmen's Compensa-
tion and not within the regular Statute of Limitations.
40
Indiana, generally, accords with the other states regard-
ing limitations on personal actions. On the whole, however,
Indiana allows a slightly longer period than most states.
There are two instances where the difference merits special
comment, first in the field of written contracts, second, in the
general "all other actions" clause.
Indiana is in general conformity concerning the limita-
tion on oral or unwritten contracts and contracts to pay
money, promissory notes, etc. Only in the case of written
contracts is Indiana out of line. This is because Indiana is
one of the many states where the seal is no longer of special
significance.41 . When a state abolishes the seal, it may
either raise the limitation on all written contracts to the level
of sealed contracts or reduce all sealed contracts to the level of
written ones. Indiana has followed the first alternative
while a majority of states have followed the latter.42
Indiana's limitations on written contracts is similar to
the limitation on sealed contracts in those states which still
preserve the significance of a seal. But it is out of line
40. While this practice is unobjectionable since for most purposes a
person is interested in only one statute and one limitation in any
case, it is apparent that the practice may be abused, e.g. Indiana's
provision that the statute may run against the state in actions
dealing with title to land is located in Burns in the chapter on
quieting title, Burns § 3-1411. Even if our legislatures fail to
make amendments to the Statute of Limitations, at least the
compilers of the various codes could include references to numer-
ous limitations not found in the statute itself.
41. Twenty-one states still give special significance to the seal as far
as the Statute of Limitations is concerned.
42. Ohio with a 15 year limitation nearest approaches Indiana's 20
year period on written contracts. In Ohio the 15 year period pre-
vails for both sealed) and written instruments. See, Note (1941)
N.Y. L. Rev. Comm. 373, 400-401.
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with the limitation on written contracts in those states where
the seal has been abolished.
In the general limitation clause, Indiana imposes a time
period twice as long as the average of the other states and
half again as long as the most common limitation. In those
states allowing the statute to run against the state, there is
no differentiation made in the time allowed after which the
state is barred.4 3  It is the same as for individuals.
III. Disabilities.
A. Effect.
Although the law relating to disabilities is usually stated
in one or two short sections of the statutes, there is such a
wide variation in their application that they should be con-
sidered at length. Every state recognizes some disabilities;
but the time by which they extend the running of the statute
and the different application to real and personal actions
presents a situation allowing for many variations.
In general, disabilities do one of two things:
1. Extend the statute for a stated number of years after the dis-
ability is removed.
2. Extend the statute so as to allow the same number of years
after the disability is removed as is allowed to one not under
a disability.44
Only in the second case, does the disability "stop the run-
ning of the statute." In the first instance it merely extends
or lengthens the statutory period.
B. Comparison-Real and Personal Actions.
.Most states permit a longer extension for real actions
than for personal actions. For example, an extension of
ten years for a real action after the disability is removed
is often allowed, whereas for a personal action three years
usually is allowed.45
Some states allow a specific extension (i.e., 15 years)
for real actions, and stop the statute completely for personal
actions.4 6 Although this appears to favor personal actions,
43. As we have seen, this is not true concerning real actions.
44. Arizona, Georgia, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wash-
ington are among the few states in this category.
45. I.e., New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota.
46. I.e. California, Maine, and many others.
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the result is often similar as merely allowing a shorter ex-
tension for personal actions, since in fact the extension allow-
ed real actions is considerably longer than the longest limita-
tion for any personal action.
It is thus seen that a preference is shown for real actions
when disabilities are concerned as well as when the limitation
itself is concerned. Only a few states, in which Indiana is
included, put the two on a par concerning disabilities and
allow the same extension in both types of cases.
C. Which Disabilities are Allowed.
In most states the following disabilities are specified:
infancy, insanity, and imprisonment for a term less than
life.
A fourth disability, that of coverture of married women,
has now generally been abandoned.
However, there is not complete harmony on the weight
to be given each disability. Most states place them on an
equal footing. But a few give a preference to infancy by
providing that no disability may extend the statute beyond
a certain number of years (usually five) except infancy.47
Generally, however, there is no over-all prefence shown to
one of the disabilities above the others.
D. General Provisions.
In the case of disabilities there are several general pro-
visions which are distinct from the number of years granted
in favor of one under a disability:
1. The disability must exist at the time the cause of action ac-
crues. (Exception-Georgia).
2. If two disabilities exist when the cause of action accrued,
both must be removed before the extension period begins to
run.
3. Disabilities in successive persons entitled to the cause of
action cannot be tacked.
4. The statute does not run at all while defendant is out of the
state.
In a number of states there is an additional limit to the
effectiveness of a disability. This is the provision of a
limit beyond which even a disability is barred. The number
47. Michigan, Louisiana, New York, and others in some manner or
other give preferences to infants.
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of years so required is large, from 20 to 35 years.48 In a
few states- recently this limit has been placed at only five
years.49 After that length of time and after the normal run-
ning of the statute the cause of action is barred, regardless
of the disability.
There are two additional limitations which might be con-
sidered with disabilities. These are the provisions of time
granted, (1) upon the death of a party to a cause; and (2)
upon failure of an action. Upon these two points there is
usually uniformity. In almost all states an additional one
year is allowed for bringing the action.
The year allowed upon the death of a party to a cause
is effective only when that death occurs within a year of
the time when the statute ordinarily would have run. In
the case of a prospective plaintiff, the cause of action must
be one that survives.
The year allowed after failure of an action must arise
under circumstances where the adverse decision is not on the
merits of the case, but for some technical reason.
There are also limitations upon the time an appeal may
be taken, ranging from several months up to a year.
IV. Summary
Little need be said in way of summary since the fore-
going sections themselves are little more than summaries of
comparisons of the various stautes. It may be desirable,
however, to emphasize several of what may be considered the
more important points.
First, there is greater uniformity in the field of limita-
tions on personal actions than on real actions. And a longer
period is allowed in real actions than in personal actions.
Second, the same comparison may be made of disabili-
ties as applied to real and personal actions. The tendency
is to allow a greater extension for real actions than for per-
sonal actions.
Third, although there is uniformity in the definition of
adverse possession there is a divergence as to the weight
to be given to the various elements. The modern tendency
is to give more weight to the requirement of color of title
48. Virginia, West Virginia.
49. Oregon, and New York, South Carolina, Michigan except in the
case of infants.
[Vol. 21
19451 COMPARISON OF THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
and payment of taxes, for which a recording of an instrument
giving color of title is a prerequisite. This may be explained
as a natural development from the occupation of most of
the available land in the country.
Fourth, the tendency is toward a lesser number of years
permitted for bringing actions.
Fifth, the tendency is to allow the statute to run against
the State, although a longer period may be given to the State
to bring action.
The summing up Indiana's position we may briefly state
that Indiana is in general accord with the other states with
the following exceptions:
1. Limitation for recovery of possession of real prop-
erty (far above average length of period).
2. The general limitation of personal actions, i.e. the
"all other actions" clause (again longer than aver-
age).
3. Limitation on written contracts (far above average
period allowed by other states).
4. No differentiation between real and personal ac-
tions as regards disabilities.
5. No differentiation in action for recovery of real
estate concerning color of title.
6. With the exception of actions against sureties and
actions dealing with title to land, not allowing the
statute to run against the state.
In the first four items, Indiana is clearly out of line
with the majority of states. In the last two, Indiana is in
line with the majority but the tendency is toward the present
minority view.
It should be again pointed out that the limitations of
actions recorded in the table are not exhaustive, but present
those actions for which at least three or more states have
limitations. However, the actions listed provided an ac-
curate basis for comparison and comment. In almost every
state there is some limitation on an action which is peculiar
to that state. Apparently some states have omitted limita-
tions on important actions. But as long as an "all other
actions" clause is included we may look to it where a statute
is otherwise silent.
In conclusion we should consider again a question posed
38 INDIANA LAW JoURNAL [Vol. 21
at the beginning of this article as to whether the Statutes
of Limitations serve the purpose for which they are intended.
If we agree that the underlying purpose of the Statute may
be summed up to be a means of compelling early settlement
of disputes and claims while the evidence is still obtainable,
our only question is, does the statute effectively compel an
early settlement? The trend seems to be towards a lesser
number of years in fuller realization of this goal. On the
other hand, safeguards are necessary to protect those who
are unable to press their claims or who through fraud or
ignorance do not know of their claims. Somewhere a bal-
ance must be struck. But with these safeguards, a number
of years as low as is consistent with sound reason seems de-
sirable to prevent "stale claims" and insure rapid settlement
of disputes.
APPENDIX A
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Ten years east of Allegheny river; 15 years west of Allegheny river.
b) Gives adverse possession to whole tract described in document.
c Tax deed.
d) Note secured by mortgage (mortgage barred when note is barred-limit 20 years.)
e Actions of tort.
f Contracts dealing with realty.
g Contracts to pay money. ten years.
h) Note secured by mortgage barred when mortgage is barred.
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(i) Bodily injury-two years.() General provision-six years for actions of tort and contract.k) Higher number of years for local judgments; lower numbed for foreign judgments.
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(j) General provision-six years for actions of tort and contract.
(1) General provision-statute runs from time of discovery of fraud; no number of years stated for
fraud itself.
(m) Except between merchants.
n Actions "on the case."
p Five years when cause of action survives; one year when cause of action does not survive.
q Infants only (on real actions only).
r Time cannot be extended altogether more than five years. except in case of infants.
a Disability cannot extend statute over five years at most.
t Contract actions vnly (and only by infants in Louisiana).
u Three years or full period, whichever is shorter.
No action at all after 20 years.
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1. The presumption is that the Statute does not run against the State unless specifically
authorized.
2. In suits dealing with title to real property (quieting title.)3W Except as to sureties.4. By decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, Gathright v. State, 129 Ark. 339,
195 S. J. 1069 (1917).5. The Statute does not run against land held by the State for "public" use, but does
if land is for "private" use.6. Except for actions for collection of revenue, upon official bonds, or for collection
of loans.7. Except lands devoted to public, pious, or charitable use.
8. But it does run against counties, municipalities, and other political subdivisions.9. The totals should be considered as a group in answering each question to e best
understood. Then there is seen (1) a slight tendency to restrict he running
against the State in real actions and (2) a tendency to grant a longer period tothe State in real actions. It is significant that only one state, VeIs.onsin, also al-
lows a longer period in personal actions.10. It is not always specifically provided in the Statutes that the lueitations shall not
run against the State. If the Statues is silent, this fact is usually found in ajudicial decision. However, if the Statute is to run against the State, such is
usually specifically provided in the Statute (esxception : Arkansas).
11. The presumption is that these states would be included as not allowing Statute
to run against the State. This figure includes only those states which have not
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SOURCES OF THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
Indiana-Burns' Annotated Statutes (1933), sec. 2-601 ff.
Alabama-Code of Alabama (1940)-Title 7, sec. 16 ff.
Arizona-Arizona Code Annotated (1939) sec. 29-101 ff.
Arkansas-Digest of Statutes of Arkansas (1937) Ch. 102.
California-Civil Procedure & Probate Codes (1944) sec. 312 ff.
Colorado-Colorado Statutes Annotated (1935) Chapters 102; 40
Connecticut-General Statutes of Connecticut (1939) see. 6004 ff.
Delaware-Revised Code of Delaware (1935) see. 5120 ff.
Florida-Florida Statutes (1941)-Chap. 95
Georgia-Georgia Code (1933) sec. 3-701 ff.
Idaho-Idaho Laws Annotated (1943) see. 5-201 ff.
Illinois-Illinois Revised Statutes (1941) Chap 83
Iowa-Code of Iowa (1939) see. 11007 ff.
Kansas-General Statutes of Kansas (1935) see. 60-301 ff.
Kentucky-Kentucky Revised Statutes (1944) Chap 413
Louisiana-Louisiana Civil Code (1945) sec. 3457 ff.
Maine-Revised Statutes of Maine (1930) Ch. 95 sec. 90
Maryland-Annotated Code of Maryland (1939) Article 57
Massachusetts-Annotated Laws of Massachusetts (1933) Vol. 9, Ch. 260
Michigan-Compiled Laws of Michigan (1929) (1940 Supp.) see. 13964
ff.
Minnesota-Minnesota Statutes (1941) Chap. 541
Mississippi-Mississippi Code Annotated (1942) see. 709 ff.
Missouri-Revised Statutes of Missouri (1939) see. 1002 ff.
Montana-Revised Code of Montana (1935) sec. 9012 ff.
Nebraska-Revised Statutes of Nebraska (1943) see. 25-201 ff.
Nevada-Nevada Compiled Laws (192-1941 supp.) sec. 8505 ff.
New Hampshire-Revised Laws of New Hampshire (1942) ch. 385
New Jersey-Revised Statutes of New Jersey (1937) sec. 2-24-1 ff.
New Mexico-New Mexico Statutes Annotated (1941) sec. 27-101 ff.
New York-Thompson's Laws of New York (1939) CPA see. 10 ff.
North Carolina-General Statutes of North Carolina (1943) sec. 1-14 ff.
North Dakota-North Dakota Revised Code (1943) see. 28-0101 ff.
Ohio-Page's Ohio General Code Annotated (1938) sec. 11218 ff.
Oklahoma-Oklahoma Statutes (1941) see. 12-91 ff.
Oregon-Oregon Compiled Laws Annotated (1940) see. 1-201 ff.
Pennsylvania-Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes (1936) see. 12-31 ff.
Rhode Island-General Laws of Rhode Island (1938) Chap. 510.
South Carolina-Code of Laws of South Carolina (1942) see. 355-1 ff.
South Dakota-South Dakota Code (1939) see. 33.02 ff.
Tennessee-Michie's Tennessee Code (1938) sec. 8591 ff.
Texas-Texas Statutes (1936) sec. 5507 ff.
Utah-Utah Code Annotated (1943) sec. 104-2-1 ff.
Vermont-Public Laws of Vermont (1933) sec. 1642 ff.
Virginia-Virginia Code of 1942 Annotated-sec. 5805 ff.
Washington-Remington's Revised Statutes of Washington (1932) sec.
155 ff.
West Virginia-West Virginia Code of 1943 Annotated-sec. 5393 ff.
Wisconsin-Wisconsin Statutes (1943) sec. 330.01 ff.
Wyoming-Wyoming Revised Statutes (1931) sec. 89-401 ff.
Note: The dates given are the dates of last publication but not of the
last cumulative supplement.

